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As  the  official  arbiter  of  when  U.S.  business  cycles  occur  and  how  long  they  last,  the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) maintains a chronology of monthly peaks and 
troughs since 1854 and an annual record as early as 1790. As is well known, Willard Thorp’s 
Business Annals (published in 1926) marked the initial step that the then-recently-formed NBER 
took toward identifying these business-cycle turning points.  
The Business Annals are a brief summary and interpretation of U.S. economic conditions in 
every year from 1790 through 1925 that could be best discerned from contemporaneous business 
and popular press reports. Thorp compiled the annals by consulting extant newspapers and other 
trade publications held at the New York Public Library. In doing so, Thorp formed an annual 
“phrase summary” across four broad categories: (i.) industry, commerce, and labor; (ii.) money, 
security, and foreign exchange markets; (iii.) agricultural production and farm prices; and, (iv.) 
non-economic  phenomena,  such  as  political  events,  wars,  and  catastrophes.  Thorp  then 
subjectively weighed the four narrative summaries that, in his judgment, best reflected one (or 
more)  of  the  four  phase  cycles  that  business  conditions  were  likely  in:  depression,  revival, 
prosperity, and recession.
1 From glancing at the Business Annals, it becomes clear that Thorp 
gave primacy to industrial and commercial activity in arriving at his aggregate assessment.  
Mitchell (1926; 1927, 387, table 23) mapped one-for-one Thorp’s inflection years marked 
recessions and revival as peaks and troughs, respectively, to serve as the critical foundation for 
the NBER’s business-cycle chronology.
2 Since the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee has 
not revised their original prewar cycles, Thorp’s anecdotal-based assessment of annual business 
                                                            
1 For example, Thorp’s phrase summary for 1813 is simply “prosperity,” but his assessment of 1847 is “revival; 
prosperity; panic; recession.”  On several occasions, Thorp interjected adjectives to indicate the relative severity of a 
contraction, such as “deep depression” for 1894 or “mild depression” for 1911.   
2 The term recession was a novel one suggested by Wesley Mitchell (Thorp’s dissertation advisor at Columbia) to 
replace the  more vague and  confusing term crisis  found in previously  written and often-contradictory business 




conditions remains the cornerstone underpinning the NBER’s identification of whether a U.S. 
recession occurred between 1790 and 1915. (The first two columns of Table 1 present the annual 
peaks and troughs to the prewar NBER chronology). 
Historical comparisons of the frequency and duration of recessions and expansions based on 
the NBER chronology proffer very persuasive evidence that the American business cycle has 
moderated  recently.  Indeed,  post-World  War  II  expansions  (contractions)  are  twice  as  long 
(short) as their pre-WWI counterparts (see Diebold and Rudebusch, 1992). Although the precise 
reasons  for  this  apparent  stabilization  remain  a  source  of  debate,  Samuelson  (1998,  34–35) 
argues  that  longer  post-WWII  expansions  and  shorter  post-WWII  contractions  testify  to  “an 
important truth” and signify the most compelling aspect of the U.S. economic stabilization story. 
Yet an investigation during the 1990s into Burns and Mitchell’s (1946) disclaimer on the 
very limited and rather circumstantial empirical support for the pre-WWII NBER chronology 
revealed inherent biases in the official turning points. Watson (1994) showed that when post-
WWII (hence, “postwar”) cycles are defined solely from nominal price data for commodities, 
crude materials, and financial instruments, subsequent differences in cyclical properties between 
the pre-WWI (hence, “prewar”) and postwar periods appear small. Furthermore, Romer (1994) 
demonstrated that, contrary to modern NBER guidelines, the monthly peaks and troughs between 
1884 and 1927 were derived from detrended data that tend to date prewar peaks earlier and 
troughs later vis-à-vis postwar turning points derived from data in levels.  
These important studies have raised additional questions regarding what we think we know 
about the earliest U.S. business cycles. Do the systematic dating errors that Romer documents for 
the post-1884 NBER chronology afflict earlier peaks and troughs, as some historians have long 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discriminating “periods of dull business” from the less obvious effects of financial panics during the nineteenth 




suspected? How reliably could early NBER researchers judge if and when a recession occurred 
before  the  Civil  War  if  they  only  had  access  to  scattered  press  reports  and  their  listings  of 
commodity  prices?  Did  persistent  deflationary  episodes  lead  the  nineteenth-century  NBER 
chronology to mistake declines in nominal aggregates for falls in real output? While researchers 
have  long  questioned  the  reliability  of  several  prewar  recessions,  a  resolution  has  remained 
elusive because of the lack of reliable time-series data. Indeed, Thorp’s qualitative assessment of 
business conditions during the antebellum period have not been as rigorously examined as they 
have  been  for  the  postbellum  period,  primarily  because  reliable  annual  output  data  for  the 
antebellum period have been unavailable. 
This paper expands upon the research of Watson (1994), Romer (1994), and others whom 
have argued that the NBER’s postbellum chronology is systematically flawed by reexamining 
both the antebellum and postbellum cycles. Specifically, we construct an alternative set of annual 
peaks and troughs between 1796 and 1914 from a simple mapping of the absolute peaks and 
troughs in Davis’ (2004) annual index of U.S. industrial production.  
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  I  discusses  the  data  employed  to  construct  an 
alternative set of prewar peak and trough years. I then turn my attention to the limitations of 
employing a single annual index (as opposed to many monthly series) that is less comprehensive 
than GDP in establishing an alternative set of industrial cycles. Section I ends with a focus on the 
differences between the new and old prewar chronologies. Section II statistically examines the 
differences in the characteristics between the NBER dates and alternative chronology developed 
in  this  paper.  Given  the  marked  differences  between  the  peak-trough  sets,  Section  II  then 
investigates the potential implications of these revisions when compared to similarly-constructed 




I.  Reevaluating the prewar NBER business-cycle chronology 
 
a.  New dates from new data 
As a basis for evaluating the reliability of Thorp’s annual business cycles, I have constructed 
an  alternative  set  of  annual  peaks  and  troughs  for  the  1796–1915  period.  The  basis  for  the 
alternative  chronology  is  a  single  metric:  an  entirely  new  annual  dataset  on  U.S.  industrial 
production as described in Davis (2002) and finalized in Davis (2004). 
Using  a  methodology  similar  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  present-day  industrial 
production series, the Davis index assembles 43 annual components in the manufacturing and 
mining industries that are consistently defined from 1790 until WWI.
3 The Davis index is a 
comprehensive industrial output measure in that its components indirectly represent close to 90 
percent of the value added produced by the U.S. industrial sector during the nineteenth century. 
The primary attribute of the industrial production index is that it is devoid of nominal data, so 
that index changes reflect purely fluctuations in real output. 
I  adopted  the  dating  algorithm  of  Romer  (1994)  in  developing  an  alternative  prewar 
chronology of annual peaks and troughs for the U.S. industrial sector. Since I consult annual data 
to date peaks and troughs, the methodology is quite simple: A year immediately preceding an 
absolute decline in the aggregate level of Davis’ industrial production index defines a peak, and 
the last consecutive decline following a peak is a trough.
4  
The new, alternative prewar chronology is listed in the middle columns of Table 1. 
                                                            
3 The relative importance of the 43 components in the Davis index changes over time by using two separate base 
years (1850 and 1880) and linking the overlapping series in chronological segments. The index possesses complete 
industry coverage after 1826, with moderate attrition back through 1790. The attribution of annual fluctuations in 
the aggregate index to any single component series may vary from year to year based upon additional factors, 
including data attrition and the emergence of new products. See Davis (2004) for complete details. 
4 I had to exclude the long U.S. expansion from 1790 through 1796 from the analysis because the validity of Thorp’s 





b.  Limitations of approach 
This simple approach in establishing peaks and troughs possesses at least four shortcomings 
compared to how the NBER currently identifies turning points. First, the present study consults 
one annual series to date prewar cycles. By comparison, the modern NBER dates (including the 
annual ones) are based on a vast database of monthly series that gauge consumer and business 
activity across an array of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. It is important to 
note, however, that the Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB) index of industrial production remains 
among the most important coincident indicators of U.S. business cycles. 
This raises a second potential shortcoming: the Davis index for 1790–1915 may not be as 
reliable as a cyclical measure as is the FRB index, which begins in 1919. Conceptually, the two 
indexes attempt to measure the same fundamentals, namely the level of physical production in 
the nation’s manufacturing and mining industries. However, the FRB index has a larger set of 
underlying components, ranging from 60 series in 1919 to more than 200 series by the 1950’s 
(U.S. Board of Governors 1986, 63, table 5.1). Since there is no period of overlap between the 
two series, there is no direct evidence that the Davis index is more or less cyclically sensitive 
than the FRB index. 
However,  we  can  loosely  gauge  the  relative  cyclical  sensitivities  of  the  two  series  by 
regressing logarithmic growth rates in each index on a third industrial production index that 
partially spans both the Davis and FRB index. This is appropriate if we consult the Miron and 
Romer (1990) industrial production index for the 1884–1940 period, since all three indexes are 
defined fairly consistently over their respective periods of overlap. Regression analysis shows 




index (for the 1920–1940 period) are each less sensitive to the cyclical swings represented in the 
Miron-Romer  index.
5  The  coefficients  on  the  log  differences  in  the  Miron-Romer series  are 
similar for the two indexes, suggesting that the Davis index is a reasonable coincident indicator.  
A third limitation of the present study is that it relies on industrial production rather than a 
more comprehensive output measure such as U.S. GDP. This choice was made on grounds of 
reliability and consistency. While improved estimates of postbellum U.S. GDP are available 
(e.g., Balke and Gordon 1989), similarly reliable estimates for the antebellum period are not. In 
the 1960s, Robert Gallman did compile annual gross output estimates for the 1834–1859 period. 
Yet while Gallman’s GNP series is more comprehensive than the Davis industrial production 
index, it is very likely that the Davis index is more reliable in pinpointing turning points in 
industrial output. One reason is that the intercensal observations in Gallman’s commodity output 
series (the primary cyclical component of the GNP estimates) were interpolated on a hodge-
podge  of  spliced  annual  sources.  It  is  primarily  for  this  reason  that  Gallman  was  never 
sufficiently confident of the reliability of his annual estimates to publish them, and chastised 
researchers who attempted to use them in an analysis of early American business cycles.
6 
That said, it is likely that peaks and troughs in the Davis index are indicative of absolute 
peaks and troughs in broader economic conditions because the industrial sector has historically 
derived demand directly from non-industrial occupations, particularly farmers, merchants, and 
the  construction  trades.  This  synchronous  relationship  between  non-industrial  and  industrial 
sectors  is  precisely  why  even  today  the  Federal  Reserve’s  industrial  production  index  is 
                                                            
5 For the FRB index, the beta coefficient on log differences in the Miron–Romer index is 0.82, with a t-statistic of 
7.14 and an adjusted R
2 of 0.82. For the Davis index, the beta coefficient is 0.73, with a t-statistic of 7.72 and an 
adjusted R
2 of 0.59. The smaller beta for the Davis index is likely due, in part, to the over-representation of raw 
materials among the 13 components in the Miron-Romer index. 
6 See Rhode (2002) and Davis (2002, 2004) for details. Rhode (2002, 12) points out that a 1963 mimeograph from 




classified as a coincident indicator of U.S. business cycles even though the industrial sector 
presently accounts for roughly the same share of U.S. GDP as it did in 1840. 
A fourth possible limitation of this study is the exclusive use of annual data to isolate cyclical 
turning points. While it is true that Burns and Mitchell set the lower bound of a business cycle to 
last at least one year, they also noted that setting turning points from annual data may lead to 
measurement problems because  yearly changes can obfuscate a minor cycle. For example, a 
small recession in the middle of a year may just show up in annual data as a year of weak 
growth, not as an actual decline. While the present study’s revised chronology does capture the 
brief prewar downturns of 1812 and 1861, other peaks and troughs could be distorted if the 
turning point occurred toward the middle of a calendar year. 
 
c.  Spurious NBER cycles 
Table 1 reveals important similarities and differences between the NBER reference years and 
those  peaks  and  troughs  derived  from  physical-output  data.  For  one,  the  new  industrial 
production  index  does  not  generate  any  “false  signals”  by  furnishing  a  cycle  that  has  not 
previously been identified by NBER economists.  Rather, the 21 cycles in the revised chronology 
unanimously correspond with the incidence of NBER cycles.   
The revised business-cycle dates, however, are notably more selective in isolating genuine 
contractions. As long suspected, the nineteenth-century NBER chronology recognizes several 
growth cycles as genuine contractions. Specifically, the quantitative evidence dismisses 8 out of 
the 29 prewar NBER recessions as either growth cycles or entirely spurious selections.
7 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not be regarded as reliable, annual estimates. They were derived for the purpose of computing decade averages and 
are supplied to interested technicians for testing, not for analysis as annual series.” 
7 By convention I differentiate a growth cycle from a spurious one simply by examining whether the trend-adjusted 




revised chronology removes four cycles from both the antebellum and postbellum period, an 
indication that our identification of spurious cycles is not the result of time-series data that reflect 
the continued industrialization of the prewar American economy. 
This paper is not the first to question the validity of several postbellum downturns. The 
elimination of the four NBER postbellum recessions (1869–1870, 1887–1888, 1890–1891, and 
1899–1900) is consistent with other postbellum output measures that suggest that these NBER 
recessions should be reclassified as growth cycles. The identification of the spurious recessions 
above will certainly not surprise many economic historians. Burns and Mitchell (1946, 403) rank 
the 1887–1888 contraction as the mildest of the prewar period.  Fels (1959, 142) goes further in 
stating that “the only difference of opinion to be found in the literature is whether it should be 
recognized as a cyclical contraction at all.”  Similar contentions have been long voiced with 
respect to the apparently minor 1869–1870, 1890–1891, and 1899–1900 recessions (Hull 1911; 
Fels 1959; Mishkin 1991; Romer 1994; Temin 1998).  Indeed, Thorp affixes the word “brief” in 
front of each of these three contractions.  
The  alternative  chronology  in  Table  1  also  identifies  four  spurious  recessions  for  the 
antebellum period: 1825–1826, 1845–1846, 1847–1848, and 1853–1855. According to Davis’ 
industrial production index, the NBER reference cycles for 1826 and 1855 are, in fact, growth 
cycles. While the output from certain commodity-producing industries in the Davis data set is 
stagnant in 1854 and 1855, many durable goods manufacturers posted tremendous growth. This 
is particularly the case for merchant shipbuilding, where the construction boom in clipper ships 
resulted in the highest gross tonnage built at any time during the nineteenth century.   
The former pair of recessions for 1845–1846 and 1847–1848 appear even more dubious than 




troughs of 1846 and 1848 was robust and widespread, as indicated by growth rates in the Davis 
index of 15.0% and 8.3%, respectively. Such industrial strength confirms what numerous studies 
have  previously  suspected  regarding  these  questionable  dates  adjoining  the  Mexican  War. 
Lightner (1922, 139) notes that the cycles of the late 1840s were “short and not so thorough and 
widespread in its effects,” while Ayres (1939, 11) argues that there was “no real depression” 
during  the  period.  Zarnowitz  (1992,  chap.  7,  220–23)  examines  closely  the  scant  statistics 
available for the mid-1840s and 1850s and concludes “it is possible that in terms of production, 
all that happened was a phase of below-average growth rather than an actual decline of cyclical 
proportions.” 
 
d.  A robustness check: Breadth versus depth 
Although absolute rises and falls in an aggregate output measure constitute a necessary first 
step toward locating cyclical turning points, Burns and Mitchell (1946) also emphasized that 
future business cycles should consider the breadth of changes in economic activity. The word 
“future” is emphasized because Romer (1994) finds that volatile movements in only one or two 
component  series  often  drove  the  fluctuations  in  many  nineteenth-century  nominal  business 
condition  measures.  In  order  to  examine  whether  this  phenomenon  plagues  our  new  prewar 
chronology, we can compare the year-to-year changes in the Davis index (i.e., “depth”) with the 
net  percentage  of  component  series  in  the  Davis  index  that  are  rising  in  a  given  year  (i.e., 
“breadth”). The scatter plot in Figure 1 presents the growth and diffusion measures for each 
prewar year beginning in 1800. 
Figure 1 reveals an important regularity: the diffusion index is never negative when the Davis 




consistent with the modern-day concept of an NBER recession. Indeed, the diffusion index rises 
significantly above zero during an industrial depression in only one instance—the Embargo of 
1808.  The  Jeffersonian  embargo  had  a  dichotomous  impact  on  the  American  manufacturing 
sector,  stimulating  import-competing  “infant”  industries  while  hammering  trade-dependent 
industries (Davis and Irwin 2003). 
 
e.  Accurate peaks and inaccurate troughs: Possible factors 
Closer inspection of the NBER and alternative reference years reveals systematic differences 
between the common cycles. The characteristics of the revisions in the officially measured peaks 
and troughs can be seen in the summary data of Table 2. The most salient feature of the revised 
chronology is that troughs are consistently dated earlier than those inferred from the Business 
Annals.  Of  the  21  common  troughs,  the  revised  chronology  predates  8  troughs  and  never 
generates a later bottom. Conversely, the revised peaks proposed by the Davis index agree with 
20 of the 21 peaks shared by the NBER reference set. 
Since such turning-point asymmetry exists before and after the Civil War, Thorp’s Business 
Annals is the likely source of the historical dating biases. But why the bias? Table 2 supports the 
contention that the popular and trade press of the prewar period were more prone to accurately 
pinpoint  the  beginning  of  economic  downturns,  than  they  were  upturns  from  subsequent 
bottoms.
8  In  an  era  devoid  of  routine  government  economic  reports,  significant  declines  in 
production  were  easier  for  the  casual  observer  to  detect.  Conversely,  the  annals  were  less 
                                                            
8 Other researchers examining the contemporaneous commentary of nineteenth-century business cycles have made 
similar observations. Zarnowitz (1992, 219) suggests that “after a strong expansion, a mild decline (or even only a 
slowdown, if sufficiently long and diffused) may cause as much discomfort and alarm as a larger decline coming 
from  a  weaker  expansion.  Hence  it  is  possible  that  observers  would  tend  to  overstate  the  dimension  of  some 
movements in the former category, perhaps even mistaking at times a major retardation for a business contraction.”  
Indeed, Mitchell (1927, 421-22) suggests that press reports tended to devote “less attention to the upward than the 




successful in isolating troughs in industrial activity primarily because contemporary newspapers 
tended  to  portray  business  conditions  as  “still  weak”  following  a  downturn.  The  prevailing 
evidence suggests that Thorp tended to interpret such cryptic narratives as a “revival” from an 
economic bottom in his top-line conditions, even though they often seem (in retrospect) to have 
referred  to  a  return-to-peak  “revival”  in  business  conditions.  This  may  help  explain  why 
recessions appear more drawn out in the early chronology.   
Another  contributing  factor  to  the  systematic  peak-trough  revisions  could  stem  from 
Mitchell’s strict interpretation of Thorp’s annual inflection points.  It is not entirely clear, for 
instance, whether Thorp’s notion of “revival” was to be interpreted as a bottom in economic 
activity, or in a phase rebounding from a bottom.  Since the two interpretations may not always 
agree in an annual setting, Mitchell may have introduced biases in the mapping that may have 
tended to elongate prewar annual recessions. 
Another potential bias is the strong influence that fluctuations in wholesale and commodity 
prices  apparently  had  on  the  affirmation  of  turning  points  in  the  Business  Annals.  Thorp 
consulted  a  limited  number  of  economic  statistics  available  during  the  1790-1925  period  to 
confirm his descriptive assessments. Thorp makes repeated reference to movements in wholesale 
commodity prices in his analysis, and in fact thanks Walter Smith, co-author of the seminal 1935 
volume Fluctuations in American Business, 1790–1860, for providing him the price data.
9  
But  were  rises  and  declines  in  an  aggregate  wholesale  price  indexes  for  the  nineteenth 
century, such as Warren and Pearson’s, a reliable gauge of the state of the nation’s business 
conditions? Over the 1790–1915 period, annual fluctuations in wholesale prices and industrial 
production are positively correlated, although the correlation coefficient is only approximately 
                                                            
9 See p. 105 of Thorp’s prefatory note, which, incidentally, is mistyped.  Thorp thanks Smith for providing him with 




0.4. One explanation for why the correlation was not higher may be the stark differences in the 
prewar trends of the price and output indexes. For instance, one can show that the Warren-
Pearson wholesale price index is stationary over the nineteenth century.
10 In fact, the average 
U.S. price level in 1800 was slightly above that observed in 1900. Since Thorp closely tracked 
the local commentary on commodity prices, persistent price deflation during long stretches of the 
1800s likely exacerbated the Annals’ tendency to elongate recessions. Figure 2 demonstrates that 
years characterized by vigorous industrial output growth (declines) were generally accompanied 
by inflation (deflation). Yet the fact that a nonparametric fit of Figure 2’s scatter plot crosses 
below  the  origin  underscores  an  inherent  bias  in  the  prewar  NBER  chronology:  periods  of 
modest albeit positive real output growth (i.e, growth cycles) tended to be accompanied by price 
deflation. 
One  could  even  argue  that  the  biases  that  generated  drawn-out  prewar  recessions  in  the 
NBER  chronology  were  largely  reinforcing.  Since  price  quotations  for  various  basic 
commodities (i.e., cotton, flour, iron) were widely circulated in nineteenth-century newspapers 
but traded quantities were not, it is probable that press reports were heavily influenced by price 
movements, particularly for farm products. The fact that Thorp consulted the same wholesale-
price  data  in  identifying  prewar  cycles—coupled  with  the  fact  that  Mitchell  often consulted 
indexes  of  business  conditions  heavily  skewed  with  price  components  to  “check”  Thorp’s 
assessments—suggests that prices played a key secondary role in setting nineteenth-century peak 
and trough years. 
 
 
                                                            




II.  Implications of the revised pre-WWI chronology 
 
a.  General implications 
The  new  chronology  contributes  to  our  understanding  of  the  characteristics  of  early 
American  business  cycles.  Broadly,  the  prewar  chronology  alters  (by  either  dropping  or  re-
dating) roughly 40% (25 of 58) of the prewar NBER peaks and troughs. The new set of industrial 
cycles may also change the conventional view on specific nineteenth-century business cycles. 
The largest changes in the duration of cycles shared by the new and NBER chronologies involve 
periods when wholesale prices dropped dramatically and persistently, such as following the War 
of 1812 and the financial panics of 1837 and 1873. The quantity-based production data display 
shorter  contractions  and  shallower  losses  following  those  crises  than  that  portrayed  in  the 
popular  and  trade  press.  One  plausible  explanation  for  the  disparity  may  be  that  the  media 
confused commercial crises with financial ones, because the latter were better characterized by 
falling commodity  and  security prices, rather than declines in real industrial activity (Temin 
1969; Kindleberger 2000). 
 
b.  Antebellum-postbellum comparisons 
This paper’s chronology alters the summary statistics of prewar industrial expansions and 
contractions. To further examine whether their characteristics changed significantly before and 
after the Civil War, Table 3 presents the average frequency and duration of American business 
cycles. Specifically, we can employ nonparametric tests to explore whether the mean phase and 
whole-cycle duration changed between the Civil War under both the old and new chronologies.
11 
                                                            
11 Following Diebold and Rudebusch (1992), the hypothesis of whether the mean duration of expansions, recessions, 




The critical result of Table 3 is that, under either peak-trough chronology, there is no appreciable 
change in the frequency or duration of prewar American cycles when one treats the Civil War as 
the sample break. Thus, the Wilcoxon tests confirm the conventional view that the frequency and 
duration  of  antebellum  and  postbellum  business  cycles  were  analogous.  Since  the  spurious 
prewar  NBER  cycles  removed  here  are  equally  distributed  between  the  antebellum  and 
postbellum eras, sample differences in prewar business cycles remain statistically unimportant. 
This  result  is  consistent  with  the  consonant  business-cycle  volatility  in  the  two  period,  as 
reported in Davis (2004). 
Another  salient  feature  of  Table  3  is  that  the  new  annual  peaks  and  troughs  reduce  the 
average frequency of prewar recessions from nearly every other year in the NBER set, to a more 
plausible  one  out  of  five  years.
12  By  removing  dating  inconsistencies  from  the  conventional 
scale, the new peaks and troughs systematically double the mean duration of prewar expansions, 
while they truncate the average length of contractions by one-third.  
 
c.  Prewar versus postwar cycles: Tentative comparisons 
As  it  stands  today,  the  NBER  chronology  suggests  that  the  U.S.  business  cycle  has 
significantly “stabilized” or “moderated” following WWII. This is clearly evident in the first row 
(entitled “NBER”) of the prewar-postwar comparisons in Table 4.  
Yet,  as  is  obvious  from  Figure  3,  the  extensive  modifications  to  the  annual  prewar 
chronology could significantly alter historical comparisons made between prewar and postwar 
cycles. How does one (if at all) compare the new prewar cycles to a postwar NBER chronology 




Perhaps the most valid comparison would be to build an annual postwar chronology in a 
manner similar to how the alternative prewar chronology was established. Consequently, I have 
constructed an alternative annual postwar chronology simply by mapping to absolute peaks and 
troughs  in  the  annual  values  of  the  FRB  monthly  industrial  production  index.
13  Table  4 
recalculates the average frequency and mean expansion, contraction, and peak-to-peak whole-
cycle durations for both the prewar period (1796–1914) and the postwar period (1946–2000) 
using the Davis and FRB indexes, respectively. Note that, unlike for the case of the NBER 
prewar-postwar chronologies, Table 4 does not explicitly test the null hypothesis that prewar-
postwar differences are zero. As we have discussed, this is because we cannot speak to the long-
run comparability between the Davis and FRB indexes (Davis 2004, 1191–1192). 
That  said,  it  is  surely  appropriate  to  qualitatively  compare  the  summary  statistics  of  the 
prewar  and  postwar  cycles  under  the  alternative  (IP-based)  chronology.  The  prewar-postwar 
comparisons based solely on annual industrial production data are quite striking: the proportion 
of time that the U.S. industrial sector has spent in recession has remained fairly constant over 
the past two centuries. The characteristics of industrial contractions, expansions, and peak-to-
peak cycles appear largely unchanged among the pre-Civil War, Civil War to WWI, and post-
WWII periods, a result that differs somewhat from those previously documented in Diebold and 
Rudebusch (1992) and Romer (1994).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 More accurately, the revised chronology demonstrates that the U.S. industrial sector was in recession in 26 out of 
the 118 years (22% of the time) over the 1796–1914 period. Under the NBER chronology, the U.S. economy spent 
54 of the 118 years in recession, or 46% of the time. 
13 It is worth noting that our alternative postwar chronology possesses a slightly lower frequency of recession and 
slightly longer expansions than had we followed an approach of “annualizing” the monthly turning points. This is 
because  the  Federal  Reserve’s  industrial  production  index  expanded  marginally  in  1961,  whereas  the  NBER 
determined  that  the  recession  officially  ended  in  February  of  that  year.  As  a  result,  our  alternative  postwar 
chronology should be more inclined to find “stabilization” in the U.S. business cycle when compared to its prewar 





III.  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the NBER’s annual business cycle turning points 
for the entire pre-WWI period, which were determined almost entirely on the basis of Willard 
Thorp’s Business Annals (1926). Thorp relied mainly on qualitative descriptions of economic 
conditions from the business press; quantitative information from the business press and from the 
behavior of wholesale prices also played some role. These dates have the remarkable implication 
that the U.S. economy spent close to one-half of the 1796-1914 period in recession. Of course, 
researchers have long questioned the validity of the early set of American business-cycle dates. 
Watson (1994), Romer (1994), and others have suggested that the NBER’s chronology for the 
late 19
th century and early 20
th century appears to be a growth-cycle chronology.  
This  study  broadens  the  scope  of  previous  research  by  constructing  an  alternative  set  of 
turning  points  between  1796  and  1914  using  Davis’  (2004)  annual  index  of  U.S.  industrial 
production for the 1790-1915 period. In doing so, this study contributes to our understanding of 
the characteristics of early American business cycles. Overall, the alternative prewar chronology 
alters (by either dropping or re-dating) roughly 40% of the annual prewar NBER peaks and 
troughs. As long suspected, the nineteenth-century NBER chronology recognizes several growth 
cycles as genuine contractions. Since the revised chronology removes spurious recessions that 
interrupted genuinely long booms (e.g., the 1820s, 1840s, and 1880s), the average phase duration 
of prewar expansions doubles and the length of full cycles rises one-half. The revised prewar 




systematically earlier. I hypothesize on potential explanations for such systematic bias in the 
dating errors. 
The new chronology also suggests avenues for future research. For instance, while Figure 3 
suggests that much of the 1800s looks similar to the post–1945 period, the period 1890 through 
1940 looks noticeably more volatile. The era 1890–1930, which several authors have used as the 
prewar era, continues to have more frequent cycles than the postwar era even when the new dates 
are used. What factors caused the increased volatility during this period? 
Taking a longer view, the paper’s extensive revisions to the prewar chronology tempers the 
widespread  conventional  view  that,  as  early  as  WWII,  U.S.  recessions  have  occurred  less 
frequently and U.S. expansions last longer. While the paper’s comparison between pre-WWI and 
post-WWII  cycles  is  limited  by  its  reliance  on  a  single  annual  index  (as  opposed  to  many 
monthly series) of industrial production (as opposed to a more comprehensive GDP measure), it 
does  suggest  that  the  most  ardent  proponents  of  U.S.  macroeconomic  stabilization  should 
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Peak Trough Peak Trough duration (in yrs.)
1796 1799 1796 1798 less 1
1802 1804 1802 1803 less 1
1807 1810 1807 1808 less 2
1811 1812 1811 1812
1815 1821 1815 1816 less 5
1822 1823 1822 1823
1825 1826 no recession*
1828 1829 1828 1829
1833 1834 1833 1834
1836 1838 1836 1837 less 1
1839 1843 1839 1840 less 3
1845 1846 no recession
1847 1848 no recession
1853 1855 no recession*
1856 1858 1856 1858
1860 1861 1860 1861
1864 1867 1864 1865 less 2
1869 1870 no recession*
1873 1878 1873 1875 less 3
1882 1885 1883 1885 less 1
1887 1888 no recession*
1890 1891 no recession*
1892 1894 1892 1894
1895 1896 1895 1896
1899 1900 no recession*
1903 1904 1903 1904
1907 1908 1907 1908
1910 1911 1910 1911
1913 1914 1913 1914
TABLE 1: Turning points in the
Antebellum industrial cycles
Postbellum industrial cycles
Civil War industrial cycles
NBER Chronology Alternative Chronology
prewar U.S. industrial economy, 1790-1915
 
Notes and sources: All reference dates are calendar-year cycles. Bolded text reflects deviation from current NBER 
record. No recession* indicates a “growth recession,” or a slowdown in the rate of economic growth based upon 
detrended values of the industrial production index. Victor Zarnowitz summarized the annual NBER peak-trough 
chronology from 1790 in Glasner ed. (1997, 731–33, tables 1–2). For the pre-WWI era, the annual chronology 
ultimately corresponds to Thorp’s verbal assessment (1926, 113–45) later summarized in Burns and Mitchell (1946, 
78, table 16) and Moore and Zarnowitz (1986, 746, table A.2). The only change I made to the NBER chronology is 





Sample cycles cycles Earlier Same Later Earlier Same Later
All prewar era 29 21 none 20         1           8           13         none
  Antebellum era 15 11 none 11         none 6           5           none
  Postbellum era 12 8 none 7           1           1           7           none
Notes:  Revised number of peaks and troughs show relative change to cycles in common with NBER.
Sources:  See Table 1.
Revised Peaks Revised Troughs






Prewar Ante- Post- Ante- Post- Ante- Post- Wilcoxon
Chronology bellum bellum bellum bellum bellum bellum statistic p-value
Contractions (peak to trough)
NBER 15           12           48.4          38.8          2.07          1.58          233.5          0.20              
Davis IP index 11           8             20.3          22.4          1.18          1.38          101.5          0.36              
Expansions (trough to peak)
NBER 15           12           51.6          60.9          2.20          2.33          180.0          0.54              
Davis IP index 11           8             79.7          77.6          4.64          4.75          83.0            0.80              
Peak-to-peak cycles
NBER 15           12           100.0        100.0        4.27          4.08          157.5          0.60              
Davis IP index 11           8             100.0        100.0        5.82          6.13          82.5            0.83              
(Antebellum years: 1796 - 1860;  Postbellum years: 1866 - 1914)
Notes: Mean durations and Wilcoxon statistics are given in years.  The two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test
statistic is the sum of the ranks for the observations in the first (i.e., antebellum) sample.  If the data are tied,
average ranks are used.  One-sided  p-values relate to the null hypothesis of no mean-duration stabilization.
Results are similar for trough-to-trough cycles.
TABLE 3: Frequency and duration of prewar U.S. business cycles




Pre-WWI Post-WWII Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Wilcoxon
Source Source WWI WWII WWI WWII WWI WWII statistic p-value
Contractions (peak to trough)
NBER NBER 29           9             45.8          18.5          1.86          1.11          608.5             0.08             
Davis IP index FRB' s IP index 21           8             22.0          16.7          1.24          1.13         
Expansions (trough to peak)
NBER NBER 28           10           54.2          81.5          2.29          4.40          480.5             0.03             
Davis IP index FRB' s IP index 20           9             78.0          83.3          4.60          5.00         
Peak-to-peak cycles
NBER NBER 28           10           100.0        100.0        4.18          5.60          505.0             0.16             
Davis IP index FRB' s IP index 20           9             100.0        100.0        5.85          6.22         
Notes: Pre-WWI sample spans the years 1796 - 1914. Post-WWII sample covers the years 1946-2000. The peak-trough pairs for the
post-WWII cycles are: 1948-1949, 1953-1954, 1957-1958, 1969-1970, 1973-1975, 1979-1980, 1981-1982, 1990-1991, and 2000-2002.
     Test inappropriate
     Test inappropriate
     Test inappropriate
TABLE 4:  Prewar-postwar comparisons of U.S. industrial cycles - Where is the stabilization?
Sample size Mean freq. (%) Mean duration Mean-duration test Annual Chronology 
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Prewar years 1800 - 1915, excluding Civil W ar
 
Notes: Bold line in the scatter plot represents a nonparametric local-linear regression from an 
Epanechnikov kernel using the linear binning method. Note that the bold line falls below the 
origin. 
 




Figure 3: U.S. recessions since the 1790s 
The NBER chronology versus an alternative set based on annual industrial production data. 
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Annual NBER Recessions (peak to trough)
Alternative recessions defined solely on the basis of declines in annual industrial production
Alternative Recessions (peak to trough)
 
Sources: See the text and the notes to Table 1. 
 
 